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Stephen Conn RESEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENT THE 
In 1970 the Chief Justice of the Alaska State Supreme Court sought to adjust 
the state justice process to the needs of village Alaska 1 through a process of 
team research by a lawyer and an anthropologist which he hoped would lead 
to an agenda for reform. Justice Boney spoke of reforms which acknowled­
ged the local village role in the legal process. He influenced the conclusions of 
Alaska's first Bush Justice Conference that "the locus of decision-making in 
the administration of justice in village Alaska must move closer to the 
village", and its calls for "greater Native participation at all levels of the 
administration of justice". The conference stated that "strengthening of 
village councils is central to the administration of justice in remote Alaska" 
(State of Alaska Judicial Council 1970:2). 
Professional justice was also to be improved. Trials were to be held in more 
rural locations, police and judicial travel budgets were to be increased, and 
education and recruitment of Natives in each justice bureaucracy was to be 
accomplished. The Conference suggested that "(T)he cultural context and 
impact of judicial administration must be thoroughly understood by all 
involved in the system of bush justice" (State of Alaska Judicial Council 
1970:4). Court arraignments were to be conducted in Native languages and 
bilingual attorneys or para-professionals were to be recruited. That an act 
was committed pursuant to Native custom was to be considered as a mitigat­
ing factor in sentencing (State of Alaska Judicial Council 1970:6). 
The University of Alaska was requested to establish an institute to train 
legal personnel in both rural and urban areas in Native culture and lan­
guages. The University, state administration and judicial council were to 
initiate programs of research concerning such areas as the character and 
processes of village law-making, judicial administration and law enforce­
ment (State of Alaska Judicial Council 1970: 3,5). This last recommendation 
is particularly important because it led to my invitation to join the University 
of Alaska. 
These reforms of bush justice were in turn to be implanted in an environ­
ment hostile to local innovation or dispersal of power to villages. The 
constitution established a centralized court system (with no pockets of local 
   
          
         
     
   
       
    
  
        
         
        
       
  
 
          
       
           
          
  
   
 
      
        
  
             
         
     
         
         
        
  
     
  
         
  
         
       
          
300 Legal policy 
autonomy such as county courts); a Department of Public Safety; a Division 
of Corrections within the Department of Health and Social Services; a 
Department of Law; and a state Public Defender Agency. Each of the last 
agencies was headed by an appointee of the governor. These state agencies 
had some limited competition from incorporated cities and organized bor­
oughs. But in bush Alaska, it is fair to say, they had free rein over the local
level and quality of service. 
State agency heads sat on the Governor's Commission for the Administra­
tion of Justice headed by Chief Justice Boney. State law and order money 
was directed to state agencies not local communities. Village Alaska had 
Native representation but no strong advocate for federal dollars.2 
The era was marked by the conclusion of the Native land claims debate. 
The settlement resulted in a prolonged process of land selectionand distribu­
tion of funds among regional corporations in Alaska. Native legislators did 
not focus upon bush justice in village Alaska. Regionalization was the 
byword of Native political organization (Conn and Garber 1981). 
With Boney's untimely death in 1972, the impetus for direction of the 
justice system and its content passed back to the discrete departments 
charged with policing, prosecution, defense and corrections and theirprofes­
sional administration. Continuance of meetings of the Governor's Commis­
sion was for little more than a mutual division of the federal spoils. Villages 
were to remain legal colonies, subject arbitrarily to either inadequate police 
assistance or, in other cases, gross overpolicing. Neither village autonomy 
nor professional service improved. The relationship between village and 
state law suffered. 
For the researcher, then, an evaluation of his role in this process must
include very serious professional soul searching. Did his emphasis upon 
cultural adaptation understate and conceal the political imperatives which 
dictated the allocation of resources throughout the period? Did "cultural 
difference" provide the excuse for justice decision-makers to avoid hard 
decisions within their own realm? Did some spurious allegiance to village 
autonomy and its local law provide a continuing justification for inadequate 
state intervention to deal with violent crime? 
WHAT IS THE BUSH JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ALASKA? 
It is a constitutional scheme of rule making, law enforcement, adjudication, 
defense and correctional activity which feeds through separate and highly 
centralized bureaucratic channels from urban Alaska to small towns. From 
small towns fledgling governmental services flow to networks of rural vil­
lages. These 150 villages of 300 persons on the average are predominantly 
Eskimo or Indian. Village legal connections with the towns are formed in 
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some instances by paraprofessional judges, police or ex-official bodies such 
as village councils who report some serious cases to state field operatives in 
towns. 3 More often connections are triggered by reports of serious crime and 
removal of offenders and victims to towns by the appropriate agencies. 
In Eskimo village society all law jobs and institutions have been designated 
by whites. Villagers, however, implemented and developed them. Thus 
although the "state legal system" and the "village legal system" are both 
white creations from their inception, each has a differing ongoing creative 
core. No Eskimo person in Alaska would suggest that village justice systems 
were constructed to handle all matters, serious and unserious; they are 
components of the state system whether the state system chooses to acknow­
ledge it or not. 
Those with deepest involvement in matters of bush justice must be divided 
into three camps. The first camp is that of the legal professionals. They may 
be divided into policymakers at the top and field operatives at the bottom. At 
the top of the supreme court is the chief justice, a man deeply concerned with 
the ideology of due process.4 He is particularly concerned with the image of 
his court. His lieutenant, the administrator of the state court system, is 
concerned with the health and welfare of his own growing bureaucracy and 
its competence as measured by the legislature, by practising attorneys and by 
high court judges. Their counterparts in the Department of Law are the 
attorney general and the chief prosecuting attorney. The chief public defen­
der combines the ideological and administrative perspectives. 
Field operatives represent the agency in town locations which serve as 
service centers. A single corrections officer in the town of Bethel, for exam­
ple, provides juvenile intake and disposition, probation, parole, and pre­
sentence reports for convicted felons for a region about the size of the state of 
Oregon, with 57 villages and 29,000 persons. The town's public defender and 
assistant district attorney each have the same position within their own 
bureaucracy and the same village clientele. 
The field operatives have direct contact with villages and their justice 
systems, both official and extraofficial. Their mandate is to keep their 
agency's service record clean, "to keep the lid on". Although they have 
usually very clear perspectives of bush justice, their propensity to blow the 
whistle on inadequate service and lack of sufficient funds from their agency 
or from others must be weighed against career considerations.5 They are not 
in a position to change the allocation of resources of their own agencies or of 
others. Discrete agencies are also not prepared to collaborate at the top 
though necessity may compel collaboration in the field. Thus, in I 975 in 
Nome, it could be said that the justice system played basketball on Thursday 
nights. Each system agency views his service and village connections as 
separate from the other. Only the village views all contact from justice 
agencies as coming from a single source. 
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The second camp is comprised of consumers. In 1974 and in 1976 they 
were given a chance to express their concerns to justice professionals through 
Bush Justice Conferences. More often, usually around election time, they 
have aired their complaints to visiting agency heads in what have been 
termed "dog and pony shows" (Easely 1973). 
Those members of this village constituency nominated as magistrates, 
village police, or correctional aides are set apart from field professionals 
because they do enjoy limited professional lines of communication which 
stretch from town to urban bureaucracies. Village magistrates and village 
police exist in a nether world, making loose connections between the power 
structures of state justice and village justice. 
The researchers are in a third camp. They were called upon to study the 
relationships between the state and village justice processes. They also zeroed 
in on the relationships of Natives to one or both systems each from legal 
perspectives, historical perspectives, anthropological perspectives, but rarely 
from political perspectives. Over ten years they researched, tested and re­
commended solutions to policymaking professionals. In short, the work of 
researchers tended to concentrate around the delivery of services to villages 
and the interplay of village and state legal process. 
As with the paraprofessionals, researchers reported to both systems but 
had a power base in neither.6 Outside of the justice bureaucracies they 
operated somewhat out of control of all key participants but had access to 
any and all. 
THE EARLY YEARS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
In Alaska, village councils, locally elected bodies, have now had 60 years of 
experience in the business of dispute adjustment (Conn and Hippler 1973a) 
or 35 more than the state legal system. Teacher-missionaries introduced 
these institutions. Their intent appears to have been to use the councils to 
advance their own agenda: to suppress the manufacture of hootch, to seek 
out and punish sinners and to urge upon parents the discipline necessary to 
operate village schools in communities still geared to the rhythms of hunting 
and fishing. Councils over time cut loose from teachers and found a place 
within the larger web of white and Eskimo social control. 
In the Eskimo communities, representatives of leading families formed a 
consensus within councils. Village councils fitted within the process of 
community and state law. Councils back-stopped and extended dispute 
adjustment. Their early style reflected the classic approaches of conflict 
avoidance - conciliation, gossip, ostracism and counseling among Eskimos. 
But, as important, they were supported from the outset by white village 
residents, teacher-missionaries deputized under federal law, the board of 
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elders in Presbyterian and Moravian communities, occasional resident U.S. 
Commissioners and nonresident marshalls, Coast Guard cutters and even a 
distant court system (Milan 1964; Case 1978). 
Councils were the last stop in a process of evolving interpersonal custom­
ary law ways and the first step in a process of Western intervention that could 
result in referral to a police and court process outside of the village. Western 
legal intervention had made impossible (or at least more dangerous) killing 
or banishment as final steps in a customary legal process. However, to a 
certain extent it had replaced these ultimate steps with removal into its own 
legal process in a distant place at the request of village councils. 
Councils were most often an Eskimo institution of last resort; even within 
its processes of case adjustment were opportunities to admit one's guilt, ask 
forgiveness and be reintegrated into the community. Orientation and not 
punishment was the usual result of the process. Two or three appearances 
before a council could be anticipated before it sought to draw in outside 
police authority. Intervention by marshall, Indian police, liquor suppression 
agents and later territorial police, while limited by geography and state 
resources, was sufficient in territorial days to reinforce the council when it 
responded punitively. By reacting to incipient conflict or to the seeds of later 
conflict, councils avoided confrontation with either villagers or with agents 
of the official legal system (Conn and Hippler 1975). 
YEARS LATER THE 
A variety of factors destabilized the council as a mechanism for dispute 
adjustment in the years immediately following statehood (1959). In meetings 
with state officials, council presidents learned that state officials would not 
support bans on liquor possession or manufacture (Conn 198 la). "Village 
rules" were distributed by district attorneys, rules easily transferable into 
state violations. 
Two factors made this arrangement unworkable. First, promised support­
ive intervention by the troopers when councils requested it was not 
forthcoming. In the Bethel region alone, for example, in 1963 a single trooper 
provided service to 57 villages. Villages were informed that they were to 
handle matters on their own and notify the police only when violent felonies 
had occurred. Letters to police during the period demonstrate that detailed 
descriptions of repeated violence were often left unanswered. A survey 
conducted by researchers and troopers in 55 villages in 1977 revealed that on 
the average it took three days for the troopers to respond to a request for 
assistance (Angell 198 I a). The head of the Department of Public Safety, 
when confronted with this data, suggested that trooper involvement in the 
survey had caused village officials to minimize the actual length of time 
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necessary to respond. He suggested that seven days was a more likely figure 
(Nix 1977). Inadequate trooper response even after villagers had attempted 
(on the field operative's instructions) to deal with less serious problems, 
destroyed the credibility of village law within its own realm. That credibility 
was, in part, state determined. 
Second, in the early 1970s drunken behavior in public or in private was 
decriminalized. Service centers such as Bethel became ready sources of wage 
opportunities and bootleg liquor. Youthful populations rose dramatically, 
partially as a result of improved health care, and populations shifted from 
villages more distant from towns to those within relatively close proximity to 
towns. 
IMPACT ON COUNCIL JUSTICE IN THE l970s 
Councils as institutions have continued to play a central role in dispute 
processing in more than a hundred villages without magistrates. Yet to 
continue that activity councils were forced to become less "council-like", by 
earlier definitions, and more court-like by magistrate terms. 
Councils confronted a more persistent stream of conflicts of a magnitude 
and severity unlike the immediate past. With external punitive intervention 
less reliable, many councils shifted from bodies of reconciliation to bodies 
which directed fines and other sanctions at offenders. This shift from coun­
cil-like to court-like approach was never completely successful. Fines were 
not collectible. Official support for fining was verbal but never explicit. 
Young persons challenged council authority (Conn 1976). 
In the late 1960s, the court system introduced appointed Native justices of 
the peace (called magistrates) into about thirty Native villages. Where this 
occurred, village councils deferred to this official authority and refused 
further complaints (Conn and Hippler 1973b). Yet because matters heard by 
councils were often pre- or sublegal in Western terms, because complainants 
did not wish to confront fellow villagers, and because village policing was 
unstable, transfer of authority did not induce a transfer of the legal activity. 
Most villages did not receive magistrates, and could not appoint them 
without court approval. 
Reports from police indicated that by the mid-1970s 80% of their arrests 
still resulted in council and not court disposition. 7 In a 1977 survey of 55 
villages a quarter of all matters processed as criminal law violations resulted 
in council or problem board disposition (Angell 1979a). In other words, 
village police appended themselves to councils, as adjudicative bodies for 
minor offenses despite the fact that for the judicial system, councils were 
illegal institutions. 
The irony of the position of the village council by the early 1970s should 
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not be overlooked. As an official matter, the state legal system viewed village 
council process as an anachronism, a fixture of law ways of a distant past. As 
an unofficial matter, field professionals armed with mandates from their 
superiors to carry out impossible tasks of representation, prosecution and 
law enforcement over distant villages were vocal in their support of what they 
perceived to be continuing examples of Eskimo justice. Yet this very encour­
agement of village justice demanded that the village system shift from a 
preventative process, capable of anticipating problems, to one that reacted 
very much like Western systems. The balance of outside intervention with 
inside deliberation was lost and village councils found their council process 
mutated out of its original form as it was forced to handle both parts of the 
process. 
When magistrates and village police were offered to villages through 
appointment and training, the issue was not best articulated as a conflict 
between law systems, Western and non-Western. Rather, the issue was 
whether villagers could adequately address their present problems with new 
Western resources inferior to the working arrangement between formal law 
and village law of earlier days. The earlier arrangement worked in part 
because there were fewer problems. But it also worked because it contained 
supportive elements. It allowed legal levels, one consensual, another puni­
tive, to interact. But more than this, by circumstance if not by political intent, 
it placed in Eskimo hands the authority to draw in external force. Put baldly, 
Western police did not intercede unless called. Yet under this new arrange­
ment what appeared to be more de facto control of village affairs was less. 
EFFORTS VILLAGE 
The record shows persistent attempts by villagers to construct their own 
system as a component of the state process. Villagers were told to turn back 
to "the old ways" and draw upon a village consensus for enforcement of 
village law. But the "old ways" were formed out of a coalition of white and 
Native authority. The "old ways" did not contend with prepaid liquor orders 
by telephone, improved air and land transport and wage opportunities of a 
younger generntion as demanding of their official legal rights as other 
Alaskans. Villages requested assistance in the drafting of their own town 
statutes. They realized that some skilled professional advice was necessary in 
order to make the laws enforceable within the state system. 
When ordinances were sent to Juneau to an agency constitutionally obli­
gated to help towns and villages, they were filed away without comment.8 
Villages were left in a legal never-never land as troopers and state officials 
refused to apply village ordinances. Even village magistrates scorned village 
ordinances. What village justice systems have had to undertake has outstrip-
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ped their capacity to deal with it pre-emptively. Problems have also overrun 
their capacity to deal with them in Western terms through policing, judging 
and jailing (Angell 1981a). 
PROFESSIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
The reality of a relationship between white legal agents representative of first 
military, then territorial, then state authority to small villages has changed 
little, if at all, in more than a hundred years of contact (Conn 1981 b; Jenness 
1962; Murton 1965). What has changed are professional attitudes toward the 
relationship. 
Professional policymakers fail to understand village justice as a compo­
nent of their own justice system. They view village process as a separate 
reality from which they, with lesser or greater capacity, remove cases to be 
dealt with in the thorough-going process that they know to be the "real" 
justice system, real justice being a process of adversary justice leading to state 
corrections. Professional operatives in towns understand the relevance of 
matters left to village justice. But, for them, these matters are simply prob­
lems happily left outside of the realm of their own professional caseload. 
"Progressive villages" or "villages which handle their own problems" are 
admired by town-based professionals out of relief more than out of respect 
(Nix 1973; Timbers 1973). Yet few would not concur that real justice as 
delivered would not be preferable if it could flood the villages. 
What professionals fail to perceive is that the interplay of state and village 
justice must be nurtured and adapted to survive. For villagers engagement of 
the systems is an historical fact. They have sought collaboration on terms 
reflective of the stronger aspects of the village justice process and those of the 
state. This implies shared control of the process. A working justice process 
has been the objective of the researchers and, they believe, the village. 
Yet does this global objective translate readily into compartmental 
ideological and administrative considerations of separate justice agencies? 
Can it be achieved if the idealized goal of planners is a fully articu_lated 
western justice system, capable of providing checks and balances, capable of 
providing due process and law enforcement typical of urban Alaska and 
urban America whether or not that goal is feasible or desirable? On what 
terms then could reforms of bush justice be made? Perspectives and interpre­
tations of "improvement" vary as one isolates interested constituencies. 
Institutional perspectives and ideological perspectives guide professional 
judgment. The administrator of the court system is said to have referred to 
bush Alaska as a "can of worms". Implantation of a centralized judicial 
system in farflung town and village Alaska was problematic. Costs were 
high. Discovery of persons to fill positions was difficult. 
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rejected. system centralized the which my PROCESS DUE OF GUARDIANS AS MAGISTRATES 
The court looks to its rural magistrates and Native court personnel for 
interpretation of Western meaning and values underlying instructions in 
Native languages in criminal and civil cases in rural Alaska. 
Yet the Native magistrate's actual capacity to try cases, to advise clients 
and to reject overtures by police who might attempt to influence the justice 
process has been a matter of ongoing bureaucratic concern by the state court 
system in the past ten years. Two advisory committees of lawyers headed by 
the chief justice mulled over the problems of that component (Second 
Magistrates Advisory Committee 1979). Of primary concern was the chal­
lenge of authorizing persons with lay education to adjudicate cases in villages 
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ill-equipped to sustain a judicial officer. Magistrates often lacked proper 
"facilities" (courtrooms and jails) and support from police regularly hired. 
The Supreme Court's Second Magistrates Advisory Committee conside­
red but then rejected ideas such as (I) that village magistrates would accept 
guilty pleas only, (2) that representation would be afforded in each village 
case; or (3) that magistrates' cases would be subjected to special ongoing 
review (Second Magistrates Advisory Committee 1978) because each would 
single out Native magistrates from non-Native. Researchers pointed out that 
these lay judges were poorly trained in Western law and operated in isolation 
of Western justice systems. The court responded by upgrading its internal 
training program. Yet what they could not create through training was the 
direct experience of adjudication or court business. 
From an administrative point of view, the 28-odd Native magistrates 
represented a needless drain on resources. The administrators argued that 
magistrates did not generate caseloads sufficient to be in every village or even 
in those villages previously selected for magistrate posts. People did not 
bring many complaints to magistrates. More importantly, most villages 
lacked facilities and all lacked attorneys, Thus they pressed for these prereq­
uisites to placement of further magistrates. These criteria, it was suggested, 
would automatically bar placement of magistrates in most Native villages. 
The criteria were adopted by the committee as advisory and not mandatory 
(Second Magistrates Advisory Committee 1979:2). Unofficially accepted by 
the court administration, their application since 1977 has resulted in no new 
magistrate posts in 112 Native villages without courts and in removal of five 
former posts since the committee issued its recommendations in 1979. 
To remove magistrates would leave what alternative? The court system has 
adamantly refused to recognize village council justice as an acceptable 
component of the process. It ignored a suggestion by researchers that coun­
cils act as lay assessors at the sentencing phase (Second Magistrates Advisory 
Committee 1978). 
What else could be suggested? The presiding judge of the Fairbanks court 
suggested that superior court judges, freed from urban court calendars, be 
assigned to regular village circuits. The circuit proposal was drawn from 
some limited understanding of the Canadian scheme of judicial service 
(Morrow 1974). Yet what committee members failed to understand was that 
the "flying courts" of Canada dealt with a tiny percentage of cases left 
unhand led by justices of the peace in most settlements. Maps were drawn for 
the circuits and the idea found its way into the committee's final recommen­
dations. There the plan disappeared with other recommendations, never to 
reappear on budgetary requests and never to be adopted by the state court 
system. The Canadian scheme did not speak to the issue which the court 
administrators so desired to define out of existence. On what terms would the 
state provide officially for the daily business of law in small villages? 10 
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What the court has left in place by near-inaction is a limited allocation of 
magistrates in 28 of 140 villages, officially prepared to adjudicate cases, but 
in fact capable of and positioned only to turn arrests into guilty pleas. 
We researchers pointed out that magistrates displaced but did not actually 
replace village justice systems in Eskimo villages. We and Native organiza­
tions advocated and tested variant forms of dispute adjustment more reflec­
tive of small villages' needs and capacities ranging from mediation panels 
which might operate alongside a fining or adjudicative authority to councils 
or boards vested with the limited judicial authority which the magistrate 
possessed (Case 1977). As will be seen, the court system toyed with the 
concept of alternative forms of dispute adjustment, following the first bush 
justice conference, but then rejected it explicitly as a court function (Second 
Magistrates Advisory Committee 1979: 19). 
PERSPECTIVE RESEARCHERS' THE 
As researchers, we viewed ourselves as legal culture brokers, prepared to 
make comprehensible, practical adjustments to both the village and state 
sides of the justice system. 
Our primary target was not a law process as measured by either ideological 
Western considerations or perceived Native law ways, but what we viewed to 
be an amalgam of both with adjustments necessary on both sides. Our focus 
was on the bottom of the system. Our goal was to improve the daily 
operation of law as reflected in perceived village needs by developing meth­
ods for enhanced interaction between state and village processes as we had 
come to understand them. These methods were to be sustainable and accept­
able to village consumers and justice policymakers and field operatives. We 
satisfied consumers and field operatives but not policymakers. 
EXPERIMENT BOARD PROBLEM THE 
The problem board experiment was grounded in careful study of the village 
council process, both historical and contemporary, throughout the 75 vil­
lages which comprise Eskimo Alaska. Assessment of village councils 
through study of their records and on the scene investigations led to our 
proposal to the court to test the proposition that a non-adversarial mediation 
panel could be established in villages. It would deal with matters then 
deemed inappropriate for either modern councils engaged in fining and 
jailing extralegally or magistrates (Conn and Hippler 1974a). 
In association with the Eskimo village of Emmonak we worked on the 
process. It was in fact a process of rediscovery since Emmonak had only 
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recently delegated its dispute adjustment to village police and a magistrate. 
The state had provided these Western law figures with a portable "holding 
facility" (jail). The council had been able to drop its role as fining and jailing 
council. It had done this with some relief. Nevertheless villagers recognized 
that an element of the earlier process was missing. The magistrate spoke of 
the family counseling she was called upon undertake. She desired something 
like the old council to take up this activity. Problems with juveniles and other 
problems not clearly legal were mentioned. These were reflective of disputes 
heard by the village council. 
With the village we devised what we called conciliation boards (drawing 
upon literature on village complaint boards in Ceylon). Villagers changed 
the name to problem boards. Villagers selected persons capable of problem 
solving, young and old, all Yupik speaking. They rejected the village priest 
when he volunteered. The researchers determined that voluntary concilia­
tion under Alaska law could be used as an alternative to prosecution for 
misdemeanors in most cases. They emphasized that the board would not and 
could not fine or jail persons. This would be left up to the magistrate (Conn 
and Hippler 1974b). The village developed the concept on its own. We had 
anticipated that matters would flow naturally from police to the magistrate 
and then be diverted by her to the problem board. In fact, what occurred was 
that matters moved directly and independently to the board (Conn and 
Hippler 1975). 
The problem board during its test phase dealt with matters which did not 
have clear legal remedies. These often involved situations involving alcohol 
which, if left uncounseled, were expected to result in violence. For example, 
the board counseled A who gave liquor to B, causing family chaos. It 
counselled C who teased D for using welfare money to play bingo. When E, a 
teacher aide, kicked F, a student, it drew E and G (F's parent) together to 
work out a compromise. It dealt with difficult family problems involving 
drinking, wife beating and child abuse. Juvenile matters were often consider­
ed. In the main, it anticipated violence. It had no power to fine or jail but 
could refer (and be referred) cases to and from the magistrate and the police. 
THE COURT EXPERIMENT WITH PROBLEM BOARDS 
When the model became an experimental "program" within the court sys­
tem, the court personnel in charge selected test villages with little concern for 
institutional relationships with councils or magistrates. While the problem 
board provided a mechanism for Native language speakers of all educational 
backgrounds to participate, only some villages were given to understand that 
one's skills at negotiation and conciliation and not youth and education were 
primary criteria. Others selected callow untrained youth for their boards. 
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Court personnel did not feel comfortable with village experience at dispute 
adjustment. They held a workshop for problem board members at an urban 
resort and had members of the American Arbitration Association employ 
models of conciliation drawn from labor, prison and other urban settings to 
teach the Eskimos how to resolve disputes. 
Some test villages on their own grafted the board into their process with 
varying degrees of success. In village X near Bethel the board found a niche 
between the police and now-fining and jailing council (Conn 1975b ). Others 
saw the problem board as a weak substitute for either a magistrate or council. 
The court hired an attorney and anthropologist to evaluate the boards. 
Although the report was favorable to those boards which had been active, it 
stressed the limited number of matters heard (Marquez and Serdahely 1977) 
and not problems avoided by board activity. The court's response was to end 
its association with the experiment. From its perspective, the boards had 
failed because they had not replaced either magistrates or extra-legal coun­
cils which fined or jailed when magistrates or outside assistance was not 
available. 
Although the court disassociated itself from the project, a 55-village 
survey two years later discovered that three of the six probem boards 
established were still in operation (Angell 1979b ). 
PARALEGALS 
Unlike the new, urban private law legal assistants who have evolved into a 
discrete professional category by taking upon themselves a variety of law­
yer's tasks, we viewed rural paralegals located in towns and villages as 
capable of performing activities not then undertaken by either professionals 
or members of the village justice systems (Conn and Hippler 1973b; Conn 
1974). 
The town paralegal's work was to combine town and village justice. By 
moving out from the town to villages where crimes had occurred, the rural 
paralegal would investigate and report back to the professional those social 
facts (as well as legal facts) overlooked by policy. The police report had 
almost exclusive bearing on legal decisions, such as bail, screening, charges, 
case organization and disposition. No longer would the professional have to 
depend on a policy report or on conventional wisdom among field 
professionals to evaluate his case with an eye toward its impact on the real 
community affected. 
Our belief in village paralegals stemmed from several considerations. 
First, we had recognized and reported on the dependence of the rural justice 
process upon paralegals in a variety of village roles (Conn and Hippler 
1973 b ). Second, we were convinced that the state legal process would not be 
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introduced in village Alaska with any balanced concern for the integrity of 
either the Western process or understanding of the village law process, its 
strengths and its weaknesses. We perceived that, at best, srate justice agencies 
would make village connections with a magistrate and a policeman. The 
screening function so essential to the integrity of both systems, carried on 
previously by the council, or left to a village policeman would be ignored or 
left to chance (Conn 1975a). Professionalization would increase the tendency 
to intervene in village matters without concern for the propriety of that 
intervention on the single dispute or in the village law process. 
PROJECTS ACCOMPLISHED AND THEIR BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE 
In the years that followed we were able to test the proposition of the 
town-based paralegal who worked for either a district attorney or public 
defender. A training-tutorial mechanism was established in both Nome and 
Bethel. Bush professionals, especially prosecutors, remarked that their pro­
fessional collaboration with villages were enhanced. Trainees became serious 
members of the rural process. 
Yet in this instance, as in many others where plans proposed or actually 
implemented at the town and village level received strong support from field 
professionals and village residents alike, reaction from urban bureaucracies 
was indifferent or hostile. LEAA representatives from Seattle questioned the 
use of$ 100.000 to underwrite the establishment of regional training pro­
grams whose end result was apparently four new paraprofessionals. Their 
concern was sufficient to induce the state Criminal Justice Planning Agency 
in Juneau to ignore the project. 
The state attorney general had promised in writing to budget permanent 
positions for successful trainees. He attempted to renege on his promise. 
Only the threat of newspaper exposure by the Bethel trainee saved his job. He 
was the only Native member of the rural Department of Law. A paralegal 
trainee with the Public Defender Agency also received high marks. Yet when 
the agency was in need of a second town attorney, she was encouraged to 
resign. She became a magistrate. The Alaska Division of Personnel unilate­
rally defined paralegal positions and established testing procedures. No 
provision was made for rural job requirements (including language compe­
tence). The district attorney's paralegal failed the test. 
The Alaska Legal Services Corporation established paralegal positions in 
Native villages on Alaska's North Slope. These trainees were educated to 
discover and investigate Western law problems and to channel cases into the 
state process and back into the village realm. Yet, when Alaska Federation of 
Natives funding from its federal CET A program disappeared, the village 
paralegals lost their positions, becoming more in a long line of Native men 
and women "trained into oblivion". 
 313 Alaskan bush justice What do these experiments suggest about rural justice? It would appear that no experiment, however well attuned to village needs or cultural values, however well-received by villagers and however useful to field operatives and their limited resources will succeed without overcoming priorities both ideological and institutional which are more important than a rural justice system that works. PRESENT THE A 1977 study of 55 villages indicates that the carnage of village Alaska is now truly impressive with murder, rape and violent crime rates two and three times the state average and many times those of the nation (Angell 1981 a). 11 Village councils persevere in 25 percent of the sample surveyed, skewed in fact to favor villages with magistrate service (Angell 198 la). Villages depend upon outside police service or service of constables who act as liaisons to state troopers. Village control has been weakened and not strengthened. The court system has disavowed rural trials where facilities are inadequate to house personnel (State of Alaska I 973:rule I 8-1). It has disavowed experi­ments with alternative forms of dispute resolution. It has not acted upon plans proposed to it to attempt circuit riding. It trained and then forgot court interpreters (State of Alaska Court System 1981 ). When its developed in-house research organ discovered that Natives in urban courts received longer prison terms for non-violent offenses (State of Alaska Judicial Council I 980), its judges attacked the problem by bringing up to the level of Natives, non- Natives' sentences and not by encouraging correctional alternatives (State of Alaska Judicial Council 1980). 12 Magistrates placed in earlier days exist as curious anachronisms in rural villages, hearing fewer cases than councils did in their extra-legal state or even than the problem boards rejected by the court (State of Alaska Court System 1981 ). Paralegals trained to work with bush district attorneys and public defenders have been forced to resign by their bureaucracies even in the face of support by field personnel. The state personnel department has developed a test for such state positions which ignores language and job competence and emphasizes skills in math competence. The Department of Public Safety has received funds to place village police in villages along with detention systems, creating a partial Western system. The Division of Corrections has provided no new correctional personnel to rural Alaska in ten years. Its dubious contribution has been to make old town jails (in Bethel and Nome) over into modern town jails. Since police are more mobile than other components of the system, and more receptive to bush service, this means construction of law systems that could make of villages "closed institutions" with guards and cells (Goffman 1961). 
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We as researchers, fascinated both with cultural pluralism and committed 
to research leading to reform, must search our souls and consider whether or 
not the fruit of our labor has resulted in a legal process acceptable to any 
standard of justice or to none at all. Those of us who are lawyers first and 
anthropologists second must consider whether we should steer away from 
research and lend our skills to law reform and political pressure and not to 
adaptation of the legal process and roles to fit small village situations. 
Were researchers deceived or did they allow themselves to be deceived? 
Were they blind to overriding political considerations that made of"cultural 
relevance" a convenient excuse for bureaucracies to employ unless or until 
they were prepared to establish a partial copy of their system in village 
Alaska, a system unacceptable by either state or village standards? We who 
are infatuated with the opportunities for redefining a state law process to 
benefit an environment marked by cultural pluralism may find our work 
manipulated by those who underwrite it and apparently embrace it. From 
our global perspective should we not be impressed by the political impera­
tives that govern the entire process of bush justice? Chief among these is a 
battle for control of resources and populations which relinquishes none of 
that control to indigenous minorities on any terms without a fight. 
In Alaska, for example, it must be asked whether state authorities want 
village Alaska to survive. Is it not likely that state authorities would prefer an 
in-migration of Natives into its cities, that in I 99 I Natives sell their shares of 
land claims a wards and rest easily on their dividends in Anchorage 
condominiums? Destabilization of village life may in the end be desired over 
improved service. Despite the historical adaption of Western law process to 
changing social and economic needs, present policymakers and field opera­
tives believe that the systems in which they function are a kind of evolutional 
by-product, natural and appropriate to all places and persons within the 
American political domain. 
Though we may have scholars and historians who decry the phenomenon, 
is it not the underlying message of Alaska legal development that the 
consumers and their problems must fit the process and not the converse 
(Friedman 1973)? The force of legal assimilation is the dominant force and 
adaptations in the name of cultural imperatives are mere pauses (or worse 
than this, excuses) which conceal a longer term trend. 
As researchers, we in Alaska have tinkered with the system. We have 
listened and attempted to innovate within the system. What we did not 
accomplish was to draw Natives into the process as players, capable of 
negotiating change, possessing power and ultimately manipulating the sys­
tem as co- or near- equals to other players. Manipulation and partial control 
of the system does not mean participation in bush conferences, seats on 
advisory committees or even membership in lower ranks of justice or police 
bureaucracies. It means negotiating on legal process from positions of 
power. 13 
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 Appendices (Accessible) 
Note, 23 Jan 2019: These appendices duplicate the content of the 
tables included in the original Appendix 1, Appendix 2, and 
Appendix 3, but have been formatted to make them accessible for 
users of screen readers. 
# % # % # % # % # % # %
Village Police 7 13.7 6 11.8 20 39.2 5 9.8 13 25.5 — —
AST 13 25.5 12 23.5 14 27.5 10 19.6 1 2.0 1 2.0
AF&W 7 13.7 6 11.8 17 33.3 13 25.5 4 7.8 4 7.8
Magistrates 14 27.5 7 13.7 8 15.7 3 5.9 14 27.5 5 9.8
Legal  Services 8 15.7 10 19.6 7 13.7 7 13.7 14 27.5 5 9.8
Prosecutor 3 5.9 11 21.6 9 17.6 5 9.8 11 21.6 12 23.5
Defense  Services 4 7.8 9 17.6 3 5.9 4 7.8 20 39.2 11 21.6
Probation/Parole 8 15.7 8 15.7 7 13.7 8 15.7 12 23.5 8 15.8
Local  Jail 2 3.9 3 5.9 11 21.6 9 17.9 22 43.1 4 7.8
Mental  Health 4 7.8 3 5.9 6 11.8 4 7.8 29 56.9 5 9.8
Medical  Services 15 29.4 11 21.6 17 33.3 4 7.8 2 3.9 2 3.9
State Jail 6 11.8 13 25.5 2 3.9 2 3.9 16 31.4 12 23.5
Educational Services 22 43.1 9 17.6 18 35.3 2 3.9 0 0.0 0 0.0
Fire 0 0 3 5.9 19 37.3 9 17.6 19 37.3 1 2.0
Welfare, Unempl. 10 19.6 16 31.4 13 25.5 6 11.8 2 3.9 4 7.8
Youth  Services 0 0 1 2.0 7 13.7 13 25.5 28 54.9 2 4.0
Appendix 1.
Source: Angell, 1981a: 39.











Homicide 28.4 10.9 8.8
Rape 99.2 50.3 26.4
Robbery 127.6 96.5 195.8
Aggravated Assault 326.0 286.5 228.6
Burglary 936.8 1,310.2 1,439.4
Vehicle Theft 446.5 3,272.6 2,921.3
Simple Assault 354.3 783.7 446.1
* Per 100,000 population in 1977.
Source: Angell 1981a: 27.
RATES*
Appendix 2.
COMPARISON OF ALASKA VILLAGES, ALASKA STATEWIDE, AND 




Burglary 368 12 98 67 545
Larceny 1,361 85 304 43 1,793
Drug Abuse 419 15 57 19 510
Liquor Laws 403 3 308 183 897
All Other Offenses 230 7 67 15 319
Curfew & Loitering 173 2 32 19 226




Burglary 245.7 212.6 951.8 275.7 268.9
Larceny 908.9 1,506.5 2,952.6 176.9 943.8
Drug Abuse 279.8 265.8 553.6 78.2 268.4
Liquor Laws 269.1 53.1 2,991.4 753.2 472.2
All Other Offenses 153.6 12.4 650.7 61.7 167.9
Curfew & Loitering 115.5 35.4 310.8 78.2 118.9
All Crimes 2,670.1 1,640.9 12,626.3 2,057.8 3,130.5
Base Population 149,735 5,642 10,297 24,297 189,970
Source: Bayley et al. 1980.
1978 STATEWIDE ARREST RATE PER 100,000 INDIVIDUALS
Appendix 3.
STATEWIDE JUVENILE ARREST RATE PER 100,000 INDIVIDUALS
1978 STATEWIDE COUNT
